USA v. Jasin by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2002 
USA v. Jasin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jasin" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 92. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/92 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed February 5, 2002 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-4185 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS P. JASIN, 
 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 91-cr-00602-08) 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. Dubois 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 7, 2001 
 
BEFORE: ALITO, AMBRO, and GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 5, 2002) 
 
       Michael L. Levy 
       United States Attorney 
       Robert A. Zauzmer 
       Assistant United States Attorney 
       Chief of Appeals 
       Robert E. Goldman 
       David L. Hall 
       Assistant United States Attorneys 
       Office of the United States Attorney 
       615 Chestnut Street 
       Suite 1250 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
 
  
       Mark E. Haddad 
       Frank Menetrez 
       Sidley Austin Brown & Wood 
       555 West Fifth Street 
       Suite 4000 
       Los Angeles, CA 90013 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
This matter comes on before this court on defendant 
Thomas P. Jasin's appeal from the district court's order 
entered on November 22, 2000, denying his motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. For the reasons we state herein, we will 
affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
During the mid- to late-1980s, Thomas P. Jasin served as 
a high-ranking officer of ISC Technologies ("ISCT"), a 
subdivision of International Signal and Control ("ISC"), 
based in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. ISC designed, 
manufactured, sold and brokered sales of "medium to high 
technology electronic military equipment and systems for 
domestic and international customers." United States v. 
Jasin, No. CRIM. A. 91-00602-08, 1993 WL 259436, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. July 7, 1993). James H. Guerin, its majority 
shareholder, founded ISC in 1971 and served as an officer 
and director of its several successor corporations after ISC 
went public in 1982. 
 
From July 1984 until March 1986, Jasin was Vice 
President of International Marketing at ISCT, and from 
March 1986 until March 1987, he was its president. Jasin 
was demoted in March 1987, but he remained an employee 
at ISCT until March 1990. Throughout his tenure at ISCT, 
Jasin managed the Striker missile project involving the sale 
of South African anti-tank/anti-armor missiles, partially 
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manufactured with United States parts and technology, to 
China. In exchange for brokering the deal, ISC was to 
realize a 35% commission on the sale, which was valued at 
$300-$500 million. 
 
A grand jury indicted Jasin on October 30, 1991, on 
three counts relating to a massive, 11-year conspiracy to 
evade the international arms embargo against South Africa. 
The 67-count indictment against 19 codefendants, 
including as significant here, Robert Clyde Ivy, alleged that 
ISC, certain of its high-level officers and employees, and 
numerous South African nationals and corporations 
conspired to transfer millions of dollars worth of military 
weapons and components to and from South Africa through 
various front companies in violation of the Arms Export 
Control Act, 22 U.S.C. S 2778, the Comprehensive Anti- 
Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. SS 5001 et seq. , and various 
provisions of the federal money laundering statutes, 18 
U.S.C. SS 1956, 1957. According to the government, ISC 
conspired with the Armaments Corporation of South Africa 
Ltd. ("Armscor") -- a state-owned corporation developed to 
meet South Africa's armaments needs -- to export 
American-made arms, munitions, and weapons technology 
to Armscor to enhance its inventory and enable it to market 
weapons systems to other countries. See App. 28. The 
government also alleged that ISC and Armscor conspired to 
import South African missile components into the United 
States for testing and evaluation to facilitate the sale of 
Striker missiles to China. See App. 31. 
 
Count One charged Jasin with participating in the broad 
conspiracy to circumvent the arms embargo against South 
Africa. See App. 27-28. Count twenty-three charged him 
with violating the Arms Export Control Act by falsely stating 
to United States government agencies that the country of 
origin of certain pieces of military hardware was Italy when 
it was, in fact, South Africa. See App. 59. Finally, count 
twenty-four charged him with violating the Arms Export 
Control Act by exporting missile flight data and technology 
from the United States to South Africa without a license or 
written authorization from the United States Department of 
State. See App. 60. The government dismissed count 
twenty-three before trial because the statute of limitations 
had expired on that count. 
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During a five-week trial in November and December 
1992, the government presented evidence that Jasin 
participated in the unlawful conspiracy through his 
management of the Striker missile project. In particular, 
the government established that Jasin was involved in the 
illegal export of American-made components, such as UVP 
lamp bulbs and Eagle Pitcher batteries, to South Africa for 
integration into the Striker missile. The government also 
offered proof that Jasin arranged to have South African 
missile components -- including missile bodies, launch 
canisters, a cut-away model, and rocket motors -- imported 
unlawfully into the United States by routing them through 
Italy. Finally, the prosecution presented evidence that Jasin 
illegally transferred certain technical data relating to wind 
tunnel testing of Striker missile components to and from 
South Africa.1 
 
Because of what he characterizes as poor trial 
preparation by his defense attorney, Jasin called only four 
witnesses at trial and was left with no alternative but to 
present nearly his entire case through his own testimony. 
See Br. of Appellant at 17. At trial he did not challenge the 
government's ample evidence proving the existence of a 
conspiracy to evade the arms embargo against South 
Africa, but argued that this mountain of evidence did not 
establish his involvement in or knowledge of the 
conspiracy. 
 
For instance, Jasin admitted that he was aware of 
American-made lamp bulbs and batteries being sent to 
South Africa, but he testified that he had been advised that 
ISC had received authorization from Washington to export 
the components to South Africa. See App. 2218. He also 
conceded that he arranged to have the Striker missile 
components imported into the United States via Italy, but 
he insisted that he was under the honest but mistaken 
belief that such an arrangement was lawful as long as 
sufficient value had been added in Italy to make Italy the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For a comprehensive review of the evidence presented by the 
government against Jasin and a thorough analysis of its sufficiency, see 
the district court's opinion in Jasin, 1993 WL 259436, at *4-10, denying 
Jasin's post-conviction motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
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appropriate country of origin for purposes of complying 
with United States customs regulations. See App. 2203-04, 
2211. Finally, he testified that he never intended the South 
Africans to receive any technical data from the wind tunnel 
testing of the Striker missile. See App. 2283-84, 2318. 
Although he acknowledged that the South Africans 
eventually obtained the test results, he maintained that the 
transfer of data occurred after he had been demoted, and, 
therefore, he was not responsible for or involved with the 
transfer. See App. 2328. 
 
On December 10, 1992, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on count one relating to the conspiracy and not 
guilty on count twenty-four relating to the transfer of 
technical data. On July 16, 1998, the court sentenced 
Jasin to 24 months in prison, which represented a 
downward departure from his guideline range. Jasin 
appealed, but we affirmed his conviction and sentence in 
an unreported memorandum opinion dated August 12, 
1999. See United States v. Jasin, 191 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 
1999) (table). Jasin filed a petition for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, but the Court denied his petition on 
January 24, 2000. See United States v. Jasin, 528 U.S. 
1139, 120 S.Ct. 986 (2000).2 
 
Jasin's current appeal relates strictly to proposed 
testimony of Robert Clyde Ivy, his former supervisor and a 
codefendant. Jasin urges that we should grant him a new 
trial at which he may present this testimony. From 1980 
until 1989, Ivy served in various capacities as an officer 
and director of ISC, including Director and Chairman of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On January 23, 2001, Jasin filed a petition seeking relief pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2255 on the grounds that his prior attorney provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Jasin contends that his attorney, who 
previously had not tried a criminal case, completely failed to investigate 
Jasin's case or interview any witnesses who Jasin claimed could provide 
exculpatory evidence or useful expert testimony. Jasin also claims that 
his attorney neglected to object to the government's violations of Jasin's 
rights under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6), the Speedy Trial Act, and the Due 
Process Clause. Although Jasin dedicates several pages of his brief to his 
attorney's alleged failures, his section 2255 motion still was pending in 
the district court when he took this appeal and is not implicated directly 
on this appeal. 
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Board of ISCT, President of ISC, and CEO of ISC 
International. Jasin subpoenaed Ivy to testify at trial, but 
Ivy invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination and refused to testify. After years of delay, Ivy 
eventually pleaded guilty and the court sentenced him to a 
six-month term of imprisonment, which he served in 1997. 
 
On November 23, 1999, nearly two and a half years after 
Ivy began serving his sentence, an investigator Jasin hired 
visited Ivy at his home. Over the strong objections of his 
wife, Ivy agreed to answer the investigator's questions. 
According to the investigator, Ivy stated that Jasin had no 
knowledge of the illegal conspiracy and never attended any 
meetings where the conspiracy had been discussed. The 
investigator also reported that Ivy stated that he"want[ed] 
the truth to come out" and that "[t]here was no need for an 
innocent guy to go to jail like I did." App. 3933. 
 
On December 7, 1999, Ivy signed an affidavit declaring: 
"I informed Jasin of Guerin's statements to me that ISC's 
exports of defense components to South Africa had 
Washington's approval." Ivy. Aff. P 7 (App. 3939). He also 
stated in the affidavit that Jasin told him "in 1987 that ISC 
needed to be cautious that South Africans not obtain 
windtunnel data from tests conducted by ISC." Id. P 8 (App. 
3939). Based on Ivy's affidavit and his comments to the 
investigator, Jasin maintains that Ivy would provide 
exculpatory testimony if called as a witness at a new trial. 
Contending that good faith is a complete defense to each of 
the charges against him, Jasin argues that Ivy's testimony 
confirms Jasin's innocence by proving that Jasin operated 
under the good faith belief that Washington had approved 
the export of Striker missile components. 
 
On September 28, 1999, Jasin filed a pro se motion for 
a new trial "pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 based upon 
newly discovered evidence." In his initial filing, Jasin did 
not mention Ivy's testimony, for his investigator had not yet 
interviewed Ivy. Even after learning of Ivy's statement and 
obtaining an affidavit from Ivy, however, Jasin did not seek 
leave to amend his Rule 33 motion to include the proposed 
Ivy testimony as a basis for relief. Nevertheless, he did 
mention Ivy's exculpatory statement in several of his 
subsequent filings, the first one being his pro se reply filed 
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on November 30, 1999, one week after his investigator 
interviewed Ivy. 
 
On November 22, 2000, the district court denied Jasin's 
motion for a new trial, ruling, inter alia, that testimony of 
a codefendant who invoked his Fifth Amendment rights at 
trial is not newly discovered evidence. See United States v. 
Jasin, No. CRIM. 91-602-08, 2000 WL 1793397 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 22, 2000). Jasin filed a Notice of Appeal on December 
1, 2000.3 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231, which provides district courts with original 
jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United 
States. The district court denied Jasin's motion for a new 
trial based on "newly discovered evidence" on November 22, 
2000, and Jasin filed a timely notice of appeal on December 
1, 2000. Therefore, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
B. Standard of review 
 
We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 33 for abuse of discretion. See United 
States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Nevertheless, we determine de novo as a matter of law the 
legal issue of whether the testimony of a codefendant who 
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial constitutes 
"newly discovered evidence" within the meaning of Rule 33. 
See United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In its order entered on November 22, 2000, the district court directed 
Jasin to report to the Bureau of Prisons on December 12, 2000, to begin 
serving his 24-month term of imprisonment. On December 5, 2000, 
Jasin filed a pro se Emergency Motion for Stay of Imprisonment to delay 
his incarceration until after the court rendered a final decision on his 
section 2255 motion. See supra note 2. On December 11, 2000, the 
district court denied the motion, see United States v. Jasin, No. CR. 91- 
602-08, 2000 WL 1886576 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000), so Jasin currently 
is serving his prison sentence. 
 
                                7 
  
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Whether Jasin waived his Rule 33 claim with respect to 
the Ivy evidence? 
 
The government first argues that Jasin cannot appeal the 
district court's denial of his Rule 33 motion with respect to 
the Ivy testimony because he did not raise the issue in the 
district court. In particular, the government points out that 
Jasin's motion did not identify the Ivy evidence as"newly 
discovered evidence" by reason of which the court should 
grant a new trial, and Jasin never sought leave to amend 
his motion to include the Ivy testimony as a basis for the 
relief. Indeed, because Jasin did not raise the Ivy testimony 
as a basis for relief in his motion, the government did not 
address the testimony in its brief and the court did not 
mention it in its ruling. Therefore, inasmuch as Jasin did 
not properly present the Ivy testimony issue to the district 
court, the government opines that Jasin has waived the 
only issue that he has raised on appeal. Thus, it regards 
Jasin's appeal as doomed. 
 
Jasin responds that the Ivy testimony was, indeed, before 
the district court for he and the government mentioned the 
issue on five separate occasions. First, as the government 
concedes, Jasin mentioned the Ivy testimony in his pro se 
reply filed on November 30, 1999. See App. 3929-34. 
Second, Jasin raised the issue in a letter to the court dated 
December 9, 1999, in which he requested that Ivy's 
affidavit be docketed as an attachment to his November 30 
reply. See App. 3935-39. Third, Jasin addressed the Ivy 
evidence in his answer to the government's reply on 
January 12, 2000. See App. 3953-67A. Fourth, the 
government squarely confronted the Ivy testimony in its 
letter to the court dated January 19, 2000, in which the 
government cited our unpublished decision in United States 
v. Evans, No. 98-1706 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 1999) (per curiam), 
as dispositive of Jasin's motion for a new trial. See App. 
3968-69. Fifth, Jasin again raised the Ivy evidence in his 
third answer to the government's third reply on January 
20, 2000. See App. 3981-83. 
 
A review of Jasin's Rule 33 motion confirms that he did 
not do the impossible by mentioning the Ivy testimony as 
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Jasin did not have Ivy's affidavit or his assurances that he 
would testify on Jasin's behalf until after Jasin filed the 
motion. As the parties agree, Jasin first referred to the Ivy 
testimony in his initial reply filed on November 30, 1999. 
Although Jasin did not move to amend his motion formally 
to include the Ivy evidence as a basis for seeking a new 
trial, Jasin filed the motion and the reply pro se, and, 
therefore, we hold his documents to a less stringent 
standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596 (1972); Zilich 
v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1992). We also point out 
that even if Jasin explicitly had relied on the Ivy evidence 
by amending his motion the result in the district court 
would have been the same as that court held that the 
testimony of another codefendent that became available 
only after trial was not "newly discovered." See Jasin, 2000 
WL 1793397, at *3-4. In all of the circumstances, we 
conclude that Jasin properly raised the Ivy evidence before 
the district court and did not waive the issue for appeal.4 
 
B. Whether the District Court erred by failing to consider 
the Ivy evidence? 
 
Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 33 authorizes a district 
court to grant a new trial "if the interests of justice so 
require." If a defendant seeks a new trial based on "newly 
discovered evidence," he must file the motion within three 
years of the verdict.5 To determine whether a new trial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We hasten to add that we are not suggesting that a district court must 
scrutinize every document that a party files in connection with a pending 
motion to determine whether the court effectively should expand the 
scope of the motion. Here, however, there is a special situation as Jasin 
filed his papers pro se, he mentioned the Ivy testimony in several 
documents he filed, and the government addressed the issue that this 
testimony raised. Thus, our ruling is very narrow and is dependent on 
the presence of the unusual circumstances of this case. 
 
5. In 1998, Rule 33 was amended in two significant ways. First, the time 
period within which a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence must be filed was increased from two to three years. Second, 
under the previous version of Rule 33, the time period for filing a motion 
for a new trial ran from the "final judgment," which referred to the 
action 
of the court of appeals on a direct appeal from the conviction. The rule 
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based on "newly discovered evidence" should be granted, 
courts apply the following five-part test: 
 
       (a) the evidence must be[,] in fact, newly discovered, 
       i.e., discovered since trial; (b) facts must be alleged 
       from which the court may infer diligence on the part of 
       the movant; (c) evidence relied on[ ] must not be merely 
       cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to 
       the issues involved; and (e) it must be such, and of 
       such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly 
       discovered evidence would probably produce an 
       acquittal. 
 
United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 
1976). See also United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1205, 
1215 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
As already noted, the district court's order of November 
22, 2000, denying Jasin's motion for a new trial did not 
specifically address the Ivy evidence. Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as we have determined that Jasin raised the 
issue presented by the Ivy evidence in the district court, we 
agree with Jasin that the court erred in failing to consider 
the evidence. Indeed, the government believes that, 
assuming Jasin has not waived the issue, we should 
remand the case so that the district court properly can 
consider whether the Ivy testimony constitutes "newly 
discovered evidence." See Br. of Appellee at 45. Jasin 
requests, however, that we decide the issue instead of 
remanding the case. He argues that remanding the case 
will deny him effective relief for he likely would have served 
his entire sentence by the time the district court finally 
considers the matter. See Br. of Appellant at 32. 
 
We will proceed as Jasin wishes. While ordinarily in 
circumstances similar to those here we might remand the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was changed to establish the district court's verdict as the point at 
which the period begins to run. 
 
Because Jasin was convicted in 1992, the district court applied the 
pre-1998 version of Rule 33 to his case. Inasmuch as we affirmed Jasin's 
conviction on August 12, 1999, and Jasin filed his motion for a new trial 
on September 26, 1999, Jasin filed his motion well within the applicable 
time period. 
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matter for reconsideration by the district court, as we 
stated in PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 308 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1974), "[i]t is proper for an appellate court to affirm a 
correct decision of a lower court even when that decision is 
based on an inappropriate ground." Of course, if we uphold 
the order denying the new trial, our opinion will come 
comfortably within that principle. Moreover, inasmuch as 
we make our determination as a matter of law that the Ivy 
testimony is not newly discovered evidence, we see no 
reason to remand. 
 
C. Whether the unavailable testimony of a codefendant 
who invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial qualifies 
as "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 33 ? 
 
The pivotal issue on appeal is whether the previously 
known, but only newly available, testimony of a 
codefendant who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and did not testify at trial 
qualifies as "newly discovered evidence" for the purpose of 
considering a motion for a new trial under Rule 33. After 
careful consideration of this matter, we join the majority of 
courts of appeals in concluding that evidence known but 
unavailable at trial does not constitute "newly discovered 
evidence" within the meaning of Rule 33.6 
 
The first prong of the Iannelli test addresses whether the 
proffered evidence is "newly discovered" -- that is, whether 
it was known to the defendant at trial. See United States v. 
Bujese, 371 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1967) ("It is equally well 
settled that evidence is not `newly discovered' when it was 
known or could have been known by the diligence of the 
defendant or his counsel."). It is undisputed that Jasin was 
aware of the substance of the Ivy testimony at the time of 
trial, but that the testimony nevertheless was unavailable 
because Ivy would not testify and could avoid doing so by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We are one of only a few courts of appeals who have yet to resolve this 
issue in a published opinion. The "question of whether testimony which 
was previously unavailable because of a witness' invocation of a fifth 
amendment right, properly can be deemed `newly discovered' under Rule 
33" surfaced in United States v. Herman, 614 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 
1980), but we decided to let the district court address the "thorny" issue 
in the first instance on remand. 
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asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination.7 It was only after Ivy had pleaded guilty and 
served his sentence that his testimony became available. In 
these circumstances, Jasin urges us to adopt the approach 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States 
v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060 (1st Cir. 1997), by 
establishing that "newly available evidence" constitutes 
"newly discovered evidence" within the meaning of Rule 33. 
The government, on the other hand, requests that we reject 
the holding in Montilla-Rivera and follow the majority rule 
that "newly available evidence" is not synonymous with 
"newly discovered evidence." 
 
In Montilla-Rivera, the three defendants sold two 
kilograms of cocaine to a DEA confidential informant and 
subsequently were indicted for distribution and conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine. See id. at 1061-62. Two defendants 
entered guilty pleas, but defendant Montilla went to trial, 
maintaining that his mere presence did not constitute 
participation in the drug sale. See id. He subpoenaed his 
co-defendants as witnesses, but informed the court that 
they would exercise their Fifth Amendment rights and 
would not testify, as they both were awaiting sentencing. 
See id. at 1063. After being convicted on the conspiracy 
count, Montilla filed a motion for a new trial, attaching 
thereto affidavits from his codefendants, who since had 
been sentenced, to the effect that Montilla had not been 
involved in the drug transaction. See id. The district court 
denied Montilla's motion, ruling that his codefendants were 
known and available at the time of trial, and therefore, their 
testimony did not constitute "newly discovered evidence" 
under Rule 33. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Indeed, our holding is premised entirely on the conclusion that Jasin 
was aware of the substance of Ivy's testimony at trial, for if Ivy 
presented 
evidence of which Jasin had no knowledge at trial, Ivy's testimony clearly 
would be "newly discovered evidence" under the first prong of Iannelli 
and would be a basis for granting a new trial if it satisfied the 
remaining 
prongs. Nevertheless, nowhere in his briefs or the record does Jasin 
intimate that he was unaware of the substance of Ivy's statements at 
trial. Instead, he argues that we should make an exception under the 
Iannelli test for previously known but newly available evidence. 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed on the 
grounds that "[t]his circuit has, for almost twenty years, 
held that the `newly discovered' language of Rule 33 
encompasses evidence that was `unavailable.' " Id. at 1066. 
The court rejected the district court's conclusion that the 
codefendants were available to testify, explaining that 
Montilla "did not have the power to compel them to testify 
at his trial in light of their Fifth Amendment privileges." Id. 
at 1065. In reaching its result, the court reasoned that 
"there seems little distinction between evidence which a 
defendant could not present because he did not know of it 
and evidence which he could not present because the 
witness was unavailable despite exercising due diligence." 
Id. at 1066.8 
 
The government dismisses Montilla-Rivera as an anomaly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Jasin also cites two opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit that he believes by implication held that"newly discovered 
evidence" includes testimony of codefendants who refused to testify at 
trial by asserting their Fifth Amendment rights. In Newsom v. United 
States, 311 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1962), defendants Newsom and Linton 
were indicted jointly for selling 276 grams of marijuana to an undercover 
federal agent. Newsom went to trial and was convicted. See id. Only days 
later, Linton entered a guilty plea and stated in open court that he was 
sorry for getting his friend Newsom in trouble because Newsom had no 
knowledge of the drug sale. See id. at 78. Shortly thereafter, Newsom 
filed a motion for a new trial accompanied by an affidavit from Linton 
attesting to Newsom's innocence. See id. at 78-79. The court of appeals 
reversed the district court's denial of the motion on the grounds that the 
evidence against Newsom was "weak," that Newsom was unable to avail 
himself of Linton's testimony at trial, and that another jury could "find 
Linton's testimony sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
the truth and the meaning of the special employee, and hence of the 
defendant's guilt." Id. at 79. 
 
In Ledet v. United States, 297 F.2d 737, 738 (5th Cir. 1962), customs 
agents found 41 grams of heroin under the passenger seat occupied by 
defendant Ledet in a car owned and driven by defendant Bourg. At trial, 
Bourg opted not to testify, but Ledet took the stand and testified that he 
knew nothing about the heroin. See id. After both defendants were 
convicted and sentenced, Bourg offered an affidavit completely 
exculpating Ledet. See id. at 739. The court of appeals reversed the 
district court largely based on the "ambiguous facts" concerning 
possession of the heroin. The court explained that: 
       the fact that total and complete possession by Bourg, the owner and 
       driver of the automobile would be entirely consistent with Ledet's 
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and argues that we should follow the majority rule that 
testimony known to the defendant at the time of trial is not 
"newly discovered evidence," even if it was unavailable at 
trial by reason of the witness's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. See United States v. Freeman, 77 
F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 1996) ("When a defendant is aware 
of a co-defendant's proposed testimony prior to trial, it 
cannot be deemed newly discovered under Rule 33 even if 
the co-defendant was unavailable because she invoked the 
Fifth Amendment."); United States v. Theodosopoulos, 48 
F.3d 1438, 1448-50 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that post- 
trial testimony of person who exercised his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination does not 
qualify as "newly discovered evidence" because defendant 
knew substance of testimony during trial); United States v. 
Glover, 21 F.3d 133, 138 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
newly available testimony of individual who asserted his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was 
not "newly discovered evidence" within the meaning of Rule 
33); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1339 (10th 
Cir. 1994) ("If a former codefendant who originally chose 
not to testify subsequently comes forward and offers 
testimony exculpating a defendant, the evidence is not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       complete innocence or knowledge of, or dominion over, the 
       narcotics, requires that a new trial be granted in order that the 
       previously silent witness who knows most about the transaction 
       may be given an opportunity to testify to facts that he has now 
       asserted in the form of an affidavit. 
 
Id. 
 
Jasin's reliance on Newsom and Ledet, while understandable, is 
misplaced for the court based both opinions on the"peculiar 
circumstances" of the respective cases. Newsom, 311 F.2d at 79; Ledet, 
297 F.2d at 739. Indeed, the court later explicitly limited these cases to 
their facts and rejected the contention that Jasin makes here that "newly 
available evidence" constitutes "newly discovered evidence" within the 
meaning of Rule 33. See United States v. Metz , 652 F.2d 478, 480 (5th 
Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Perez-Paredes, 678 F. Supp. 259, 
261 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that "Metz narrowly restricts both Ledet and 
Newsom to their facts and . . . rejects the notion that newly available 
evidence is synonymous with newly discovered evidence for the purposes 
of a motion for a new trial"). 
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newly discovered if the defendant was aware of the 
proposed testimony prior to trial."); United States v. Dale, 
991 F.2d 819, 838-39 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The unanimous 
view of circuits who have considered the question is that 
this [newly discovered evidence] requirement is not met 
simply by offering the post-trial testimony of a co- 
conspirator who refused to testify at trial."); United States v. 
Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
"when a defendant who has chosen not to testify 
subsequently comes forward to offer testimony exculpating 
a co-defendant, the evidence is not `newly discovered' "); 
United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th 
Cir. 1992) ("The Ninth Circuit has adopted the view that 
when a defendant who has chosen not to testify 
subsequently comes forward to offer testimony exculpating 
a co-defendant, the evidence is not newly discovered." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. 
Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that 
"[w]hen a defendant who has chosen not to testify 
subsequently comes forward to offer testimony exculpating 
a co-defendant, the evidence is not `newly discovered' "); 
United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (concluding that newly available, exculpatory 
testimony of codefendant "cannot be deemed `newly 
discovered evidence' within the meaning of Rule 33" if 
defendants were aware of testimony before trial); United 
States v. Metz, 652 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(concluding that testimony of codefendant who was 
unavailable at joint trial because he invoked the Fifth 
Amendment "cannot be considered `newly discovered' "); 
United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 1981) 
("When a defendant who has chosen not to testify 
subsequently comes forward to offer testimony exculpating 
a co-defendant, the evidence is not `newly discovered.' "), 
overruled on other grounds, United States v. McConney, 728 
F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). See also United States 
v. Yu, 902 F. Supp. 464, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding 
that testimony of individual who did not testify at trial "can 
at best be characterized as `newly available,' which is not 
synonymous with newly discovered evidence on a Rule 33 
motion" (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd mem., 
101 F.3d 1393 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Matos, 781 
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F. Supp. 273, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); United States v. 
Persinger, 587 F. Supp. 899, 901 (W.D. Pa. 1984). 
 
Courts generally consider exculpatory testimony offered 
by codefendants after they have been sentenced to be 
inherently suspect. Indeed, "a court must exercise great 
caution in considering evidence to be `newly discovered' 
when it existed all along and was unavailable only because 
a co-defendant, since convicted, had availed himself of his 
privilege not to testify." United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 
270, 286 n.33 (2d Cir. 1973). The rationale for casting a 
skeptical eye on such exculpatory testimony is manifest. 
 
       It would encourage perjury to allow a new trial once co- 
       defendants have determined that testifying is no longer 
       harmful to themselves. They may say whatever they 
       think might help their co-defendant, even to the point 
       of pinning all the guilt on themselves, knowing they are 
       safe from retrial. Such testimony would be 
       untrustworthy and should not be encouraged. 
 
Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d at 1188. 
 
Jasin attempts to distinguish these cases by suggesting 
that the courts weighed all of the Iannelli factors before 
ruling on the motion rather than merely applying a 
"categorical ban" on codefendant testimony that was 
unavailable at trial because the individual asserted his 
Fifth Amendment rights. See Br. of Appellant at 40. He 
maintains that when these courts denied motions for a new 
trial based on newly available codefendant testimony, at 
least one other Iannelli factor was unsatisfied, such as, for 
example, diligence, materiality, or likelihood of producing 
an acquittal. See id. Although this is true in some of the 
cases, it is not true in all of them. For instance, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Reyes-Alvarado ended its 
Iannelli-style analysis after it determined that the evidence 
was not "newly discovered" insofar as it had been offered by 
codefendants who had refused to testify at trial. The Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in DiBernardo likewise 
considered only whether there was "newly discovered 
evidence" in affirming the district court's denial of the 
motion for a new trial. See also Rogers, 982 F.2d at 1245; 
Lockett, 919 F.2d at 591-92; Metz, 652 F.2d at 479-81. 
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Although it may be advisable for a district court to analyze 
each prong of the Iannelli test after finding that one factor 
has not been met, such an analysis of the remaining factors 
is not required inasmuch as the failure of one element is a 
sufficient basis to deny a motion for a new trial. 9 
 
Jasin also cites two of our opinions that he believes 
implicitly reject a categorical ban on newly available 
codefendant testimony to support a Rule 33 motion. In 
United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), four 
men were indicted for embezzling and conspiring to 
embezzle $100,000 from a union pension fund. Defendant 
La Duca went to trial and called his codefendant, Neiman, 
as a witness, but Neiman, who already had pled guilty to 
the conspiracy count, invoked his Fifth Amendment rights 
and thus would not testify. Nevertheless, after Neiman was 
sentenced and La Duca was convicted, Neiman expressed 
his willingness to testify on La Duca's behalf. Consequently, 
La Duca filed a motion for a new trial supported by an 
affidavit in which Neiman stated he would provide 
testimony exonerating La Duca. 
 
The district court denied the motion on the grounds that 
La Duca had not been diligent in requesting that the 
government provide Neiman use immunity for his 
testimony. Although we rejected the district court's 
rationale, we nevertheless affirmed its denial of the motion 
for a new trial on the alternative grounds that (1) La Duca 
had not been diligent in determining whether Neiman still 
had a Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of La Duca's 
trial and (2) Neiman's testimony probably would not have 
produced an acquittal. Jasin maintains that our application 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We recognize that in some instances, application of the Iannelli 
factors 
may require a necessarily inexact analysis as, for example, whether the 
evidence probably would have produced an acquittal. In such 
circumstances, it might well be particularly prudent for a court 
considering a Rule 33 motion to consider all the Iannelli factors. On the 
other hand, if a court determines as a matter of law that evidence is not 
newly discovered, then no matter what the court's conclusions are as to 
the other Iannelli factors, it must deny the defendant's Rule 33 motion. 
Of course, even in those circumstances, it might be advisable for a 
district court to consider other Iannelli factors, as it is possible that 
a 
court of appeals might regard the evidence as newly discovered. 
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of the Iannelli test to Neiman's testimony despite his status 
as a codefendant was an implicit rejection of a categorical 
ban on newly available codefendant testimony. 
 
In United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 966 (3d Cir. 
1981), defendants Lowell and Pionzio were tried jointly for 
and convicted of participation in a bribery conspiracy. 
Pionzio did not testify at trial, but later, under a grant of 
immunity, he provided grand jury testimony that appeared 
to exculpate Lowell. Lowell did not file a Rule 33 motion 
based on Pionzio's grand jury testimony with the district 
court, but instead raised the issue for the first time on 
appeal. In our opinion, we noted that Pionzio's grand jury 
testimony, if true, completely contradicted the only witness 
who tied Lowell to the bribery conspiracy. Even so, we 
refused to weigh the probative value of Pionzio's testimony, 
stating that it would "be necessary for Lowell to raise this 
issue, if at all, in an appropriate motion under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 33, to be presented in the first instance to the 
district court." Id. at 966. We added:"Pionzio's newly given 
testimony may or may not be sufficiently exculpatory to 
warrant retrial on the basis of newly discovered evidence." 
Id. 
 
Even though Jasin relies on these opinions, neither one 
controls our result. Although Jasin is correct that Rocco did 
not reject Neiman's testimony because of his status as a 
codefendant, we did not address squarely the issue of 
whether testimony that was unavailable to a defendant as 
a result of the witness's Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination qualifies as "newly discovered evidence" 
under Rule 33. Similarly, Lowell is of little help to Jasin. 
We did not say in Lowell that the codefendant's testimony 
would constitute newly discovered evidence; we merely 
stated that if the defendant were to raise the issue at all, he 
would have to do so in a Rule 33 motion before the matter 
could be addressed on appeal. At bottom, although these 
two decisions perhaps leave the door open for us to adopt 
the holding in Montilla-Rivera, the opinions do not make a 
persuasive case for such an approach. 
 
The government urges us to reject Jasin's interpretation 
of Rocco and Lowell and instead follow the reasoning of our 
more recent unreported opinion in United States v. Evans, 
 
                                18 
  
No. 98-1706 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 1999) (per curiam), which the 
government cites only as "persuasive authority." Although 
there can be no doubt that Evans supports the result we 
reach here, inasmuch as the opinion is unreported it 
should not be regarded as precedential. See Third Circuit 
IOP 5.8. Thus, we reach our result on the bases we have 
set forth independently of our result in Evans . 
 
Having said that, we nevertheless will explore the Evans 
decision further, for it exposes the fallacy of Jasin's 
argument. In that case, defendants Evans and Handy were 
convicted of various offenses related to a bank robbery. 
Evans filed a Rule 33 motion several years later based on 
an affidavit from Handy stating that Handy's attorney 
informed the prosecution during plea negotiations that the 
masked man accompanying Handy during the robbery was 
actually the government's key witness, Tyrone Mallory, not 
Evans. The panel considered the substance of the 
statement to constitute two distinct pieces of evidence: (1) 
that Evans was not the masked robber and (2) that Mallory 
was the masked robber. 
 
The panel concluded that the first piece of evidence that 
Evans was not the masked robber failed the first prong of 
the Iannelli test because Evans knew at the time of trial 
that he was not the masked man. In so holding, the panel 
explicitly rejected Montilla-Rivera, opting to align with other 
courts of appeals who have determined that "newly 
available evidence" is not synonymous with "newly 
discovered evidence." The panel concluded that our "limited 
jurisprudence on this narrow matter does not allow for Rule 
33 relief if the evidence is newly available." Id. at 7 n.4 
(citing Herman, 614 F.2d at 372, and Bujese, 371 F.2d at 
125). 
 
With regard to the second piece of evidence, the panel 
stated that "[t]he evidence that Mallory was the masked 
robber is conceivably new and may meet the first prong of 
the test." Id. at 7. The panel nevertheless affirmed the 
district court's denial of the motion for new trial because it 
could not "say that this testimony would probably have 
produced an acquittal." Id. Jasin insists that the holding 
with respect to this second piece of evidence supports his 
position insofar as the panel did not bar the newly available 
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testimony because it was offered by a codefendant, but 
instead fully applied the Iannelli test and ultimately 
concluded that the evidence failed the fifth prong. Jasin 
loses sight, however, of the crux of the issue. Unlike Evans 
who did not know the substance of Handy's statement 
regarding the true identity of the masked robber, Jasin was 
aware of the substance of Ivy's testimony -- namely, that 
Jasin was not involved in or aware of the conspiracy. In 
other words, Ivy's testimony is analogous to the first part of 
Handy's statement, not the second. Jasin fails to 
understand that whether the defendant was aware of the 
substance of the testimony at the time of trial-- not 
whether the testimony came from a codefendant who 
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial-- is the 
determining factor under the first prong of the Iannelli test. 
Consequently, even under Jasin's reading of Evans, Jasin's 
knowledge of the substance of Ivy's testimony before trial, 
regardless of Ivy's unavailability as a witness during trial, is 
fatal to the Rule 33 motion for new trial. 
 
Finally, Jasin argues that imposing a per se ban10 on 
subsequently available codefendant testimony is not"in the 
interests of justice." Jasin recognizes that such testimony 
should be considered with greater caution, but he insists 
that courts should consider it with this justified skepticism 
in the context of all five prongs of the Iannelli test rather 
than categorically banning it under the "newly discovered" 
prong. He argues that if courts are concerned about the 
credibility of a convicted codefendant's testimony because 
he or she falsely may assume all of the blame without 
further consequences in an effort to help his or her cohort, 
courts should weigh this possibility under the fifth Iannelli 
prong when they determine whether such questionable 
testimony probably would produce an acquittal. Jasin 
contends that his approach "affords an innocent defendant 
-- particularly one who was convicted, as Jasin was here, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Throughout his briefs, Jasin insists on characterizing the holdings of 
the majority of the courts of appeals as imposing a per se ban on newly 
available codefendant testimony. We do not interpret these opinions or 
our holding as such. The standard we adopt today bans newly available 
codefendant testimony only if the defendant was aware of the substance 
of the testimony at trial. 
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on weak evidence -- the opportunity to raise exculpatory 
evidence that he was unable to present at trial through no 
fault of his own." Br. of Appellant at 43-44. 11 
 
The government responds that the rule proposed by 
Jasin would cause chaos within the criminal justice 
system. It argues that acceptance of Jasin's position that 
testimony of a codefendant after his or her sentencing 
qualifies as "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 33 
"could render countless joint criminal trials meaningless, 
only to be followed, in later years, by multiple new trials as 
defendants jockey to offer testimony for each other in an 
effort to obtain different results." Br. of Appellee at 49 n.10. 
 
In the end, we opt to follow the majority rule in 
concluding that a codefendant's testimony known to the 
defendant at the time of trial cannot be considered"newly 
discovered evidence" under Rule 33, regardless of the 
codefendant's unavailability during trial because of 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Not only does 
such an approach establish a straightforward bright-line 
rule, but it is anchored in the plain meaning of the text of 
Rule 33. Although Jasin advances a reasonable justification 
for allowing a district court to consider certain"newly 
available" testimony of a witness who previously invoked 
his Fifth Amendment privilege when deciding a motion for 
a new trial, he cannot overcome the unambiguous language 
of Rule 33, which contemplates granting of a new trial on 
the ground of "newly discovered evidence" but says nothing 
about newly available evidence. Moreover, as we have 
explained, there are compelling practical reasons to reject 
his argument. 
 
In light of our decision to adopt the majority rule that 
"newly available evidence" is not synonymous with "newly 
discovered evidence," it is clear that Jasin is not entitled to 
a new trial under Rule 33. Although we believe that the 
district court should have considered the Ivy evidence 
under the Iannelli test, we nevertheless will affirm its denial 
of the motion for a new trial, for it is undisputed that Jasin 
knew of the substance of Ivy's testimony before trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Of course, Jasin's characterization of the case against him as "weak" 
is his own. The district court merely said that the case was close. 
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Jasin's failure to satisfy the first requirement under Iannelli 
obviates the need for further analysis of the Ivy evidence 
under the four remaining prongs of the Iannelli  test. 
Accordingly, the order of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order entered on November 22, 2000. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I concur because I do not believe that Jasin can satisfy 
the fifth Iannelli prong--that the new evidence would 
probably result in his acquittal. United States v. Iannelli, 
528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976). I write separately, 
however, because I respectfully disagree with the majority's 
position on the first prong--whether the statements in Ivy's 
affidavit are in fact newly discovered evidence. The majority 
professes not to follow a per se rule barring a co- 
defendant's previously unavailable testimony, but it 
achieves the same result, I believe, by construing too 
narrowly what it means for evidence to be newly discovered. 
I believe that "the better rule is not to categorically exclude 
the testimony of a co-defendant who asserted his Fifth 
Amendment privilege at trial under the first prong but to 
consider it, albeit with great skepticism, in the context of all 
prongs of our [Iannelli] test." United States v. Montilla- 
Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 
The majority's approach is nuanced. It eschews a"per se 
ban on newly available codefendant testimony." Maj. Op. at 
n.10. Instead, "[t]he standard we adopt today bans newly 
available codefendant testimony only if the defendant was 
aware of the substance of the testimony at trial." Id. But, 
according to the majority, a defendant who has a general 
impression of how a witness might testify at trial is "aware" 
of that witness's testimony. Thus, the defendant cannot 
later employ it to prove his innocence because he ostensibly 
knew the non-existent testimony during his trial. 
 
Rule 33, however, is not always so strict and criminal 
defendants are not so prophetic. In my view, this case 
survives the first Iannelli prong because Jasin not only 
lacked the statements in Ivy's affidavit at his trial, he did 
not even have particularized knowledge of what Ivy would 
say. Ivy's affidavit exculpating Jasin in some measure did 
not exist until December 1999. The record does not show 
that Jasin knew at trial what Ivy would have testified. That 
means that the only "evidence" that existed in 1992 was 
Jasin's general awareness that Ivy knew the extent of his 
involvement in the conspiracy.1 Such awareness cannot 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As a separate matter, I question the majority's implicit conclusion 
that 
Jasin possessed at his trial the "evidence" he now seeks to introduce. To 
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substitute for particularized information. I cannot say that 
Jasin knew the substance of Ivy's putative testimony simply 
because they shared a common experience. 
 
By comparison, most of the cases from other circuits on 
which the majority relies involved defendants who at trial 
actually had particularized knowledge about or even the 
text of the evidence they later claimed was "newly 
discovered." See United States v. Freeman, 77 F.3d 812, 
817 (5th Cir. 1996) (defendant actually knew the proposed 
testimony of her co-defendant); United States v. 
Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1448-50 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(defendant's attorney had interviewed co-defendant prior to 
trial and obtained the contents of his proposed testimony); 
United States v. Glover, 21 F.3d 133, 138 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(defendant was "well aware of [previously unavailable 
witnesses'] testimony prior to trial"); United States v. 
Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1339 (10th Cir. 1994) ("substance 
of [co-defendant's] testimony was known to defendant's 
counsel prior to trial and was produced at trial"); United 
States v. Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(defendant claimed as newly discovered evidence a letter 
from a co-defendant available to him throughout the trial); 
United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (defendants seeking new trial were "well aware of 
[co-defendant's] proposed testimony prior to trial"); United 
States v. Metz, 652 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(defendant's attorney knew prior to trial the "entire 
substance," including "specific details and facts," of co- 
defendant's testimony). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
me, evidence is something tangible, such as testimony or documents, 
that a litigant can present to a factfinder. Evidence is not merely an 
abstraction. 
 
In this case, tangible evidence that Jasin could present to a court on 
this issue did not exist until 1999. Until then, Jasin had little more 
than 
a hunch what Ivy would testify. A hunch is not evidence, as 
demonstrated by the obvious fact that no court would accept it as such. 
But the majority would accept Jasin's suspicion of what Ivy knew as 
evidence. Because all that Jasin had at trial was at most an informed 
guess, I disagree. That distinction by itself should get Jasin past the 
first 
Iannelli prong. 
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I am unconvinced by the Government's argument that 
perjured testimony by former co-defendants will cause 
turmoil in the courts "as defendants jockey to offer 
testimony for each other in an effort to obtain different 
results." Gov't Br. at 49 n.10. While I agree that there is 
some risk of perjury in permitting a former co-defendant 
under no threat of criminal prosecution to testify, the 
appropriate response is not to ban such testimony. Rather, 
I would rely on the adversarial process, on the court's 
discretion to exclude irrelevant or prejudicial testimony, 
and on its ability to assess credibility. Moreover, there is no 
sign that chaos has reigned in the First Circuit since the 
Montilla-Rivera decision. Indeed, the Government allocates 
its dire prediction only a footnote near the end of its brief. 
 
In addition, I am concerned that the Government will be 
encouraged by today's holding to delay trials of co- 
defendants who might give exculpatory testimony in order 
to bar that testimony. Although this concern is speculative, 
it is no more so than the Government's predictions the 
other way. 
 
My reading of what constitutes newly discovered evidence 
does not mean that I would grant new trials with abandon. 
While I would permit a defendant to overcome the first 
prong more frequently than the majority would, the 
remaining Iannelli prongs will defeat many new trial 
motions anyway. Frequently, although a piece of evidence is 
new, it will also be cumulative because it tends to prove a 
fact already determined through other evidence. In that 
case, the new trial motion will be denied under the third 
prong. In other cases, the fourth or fifth Iannelli prongs will 
prevent a new trial because the newly discovered evidence 
is not material or is unlikely to result in an acquittal. 
 
Although I would permit Jasin to overcome the first 
Iannelli prong, I concur in the majority's result because I 
am not convinced that the statements in Ivy's affidavit 
would probably result in an acquittal. The record, in 
conjunction with Ivy's carefully worded affidavit, suggests 
that Jasin knew enough of the conspiracy to support his 
conviction. In any event, our holding today does not prevent 
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Jasin from presenting evidence of his innocence in 
otherwise proper proceedings under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. 
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